JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. 
rioration of living conditions of the population concerned and therefore increased the gap between poor and rich but it has also forced many indebted countries to exploit their natural resources in a manner that is -from a global perspective -uneconomical6 and creates irreversible results. One must only think of the demolition of the rain forest and its consequences for the world's climatic conditions.7
A. The Handling of Crises Up to the Present
The debt crises that occurred until now were generally solved by ad-hoc solutions, such as the HIPC-initiative of the IMF.8 Thus, the establishment of an authority was prevented which acquires wellfounded experience and has expertise in the relevant field and which thereby creates a base for a procedure which is characterized by constitutionality (Rechtsstaatlichkeit) and continuity. This is, however, not true for institutions like the Paris Club (established in 1954) or the London Club.9 Both institutions undoubtedly do have the above mentioned expertise and the corresponding continuity. Yet both institutions do not -just like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) -fulfill the requirements of a procedure in accordance with the rule of law which have been explicitly laid down by the creditor countries. Since these institutions themselves are or consist of creditors, they cannot also be the final deciding authority in the procedure -even if it may be in the form of a loosely integrated judicial board.10 Emphasis is on the word "final"; the principles of the rule of law require that in the case where an agreement cannot be reached, a neutral authority makes a decision on the basis of a transparent procedure. It has to be emphasized that the requirement of transparency is considered to be one of the most important criteria for efficiency by the IMF and the World Bank in the context of the worldwide reforms and modernization of insolvency laws which both of these institutions have intensively 
B. Objections Against a New Procedure
The creation of an independent procedure would have several advantages compared to the current system of handling debt crises. These advantages will be illustrated in the following passages. Hence, it is sufficient for the moment to point out one single, but absolutely essential advantage:12 the disciplinary effect that a procedure has on all participants when they meet -as this is the case already nowadays -in the Paris or London Club. This effect results from the bare existence of such a procedure, especially since it is governed by a neutral authority. In the context of the insolvency procedure under private law, the disciplinary effect is sometimes described as: "Peace through deterrence." Even if this sounds a little martial, this sentence elucidates that an insolvency procedure or a procedure for the settlement of debts can already have fulfilled its task without having been, de facto, applied at all.
As already mentioned, I will repeatedly come back to this. At this point, it shall be analyzed how possible counter-arguments sound.
Sovereignty
Some people argue that the insolvency procedure applied in private law does not fit as a model because there is no liquidation of nations and they refer to that a judicial execution against countries is not possible.13 This fundamental objection is based on wrong premises which will be set out infra, sub 2.
Apart from this argument, the sovereignty of countries is often mentioned as an obstacle as to why rules derived from private law cannot be applied to the context of countries.
a) Transformation of the Concept of Sovereignty
This objection will not be rebutted in detail in this article. It is sufficient to indicate that the concept of sovereignty that has been developed by Bodin in the 17th century and that has been the foundation for international law ever since they been raised, most recently during the Nuremberg Trials.14 Suffice it to refer to the formation of international criminal law which takes care of individuals15 like 12. See also infra, II.C.1. 13. In this context, in Germany reference is often made to sec. 882a of the Civil Procedure Code (Zivilprozessordnung = ZPO) according to which the judicial execution against legal persons under public law depends on several precautions.
14. Milosevic or Pinochet.16 Reference can also be made to the question whether a group of terrorists that is not bound to a certain nation can wage war against a certain country within the meaning of international public law.17 Because of the development of the notion of sovereignty towards its dissolution,18 it is highly doubtful whether the mere allusion to sovereignty can call in question the introduction of a procedure for the settlement of debts which is of highest interest, especially for the debtor countries themselves. The counter-argument is of even lesser importance in view of the proceedings before the Paris or London Club which are at least equally infringing upon the principle of sovereignty as the procedure which is discussed here.19 b) Chapter 9 -Procedure In addition, an examination of the U.S. insolvency law shows that an insolvency procedure can be initiated against municipalities without violation of the principle of sovereignty. The chapter 9-procedure is a well-acknowledged legal institution which includes all creditors and which the sovereign debtor still has full capacity to act. The procedure is a variant of the general reorganization (or in Germany: plan-) procedure, chapter 11, which has been adapted to suit the characteristics of the specific debtor.20 It is probably the most highly developed approach of dealing with sovereign municipalities in insolvency law.21 There have been cases in U.S. bankruptcy law since 1934. A large number of them -especially New York City's inability to make payments in 1975 -have contributed to a further development of this procedure and its adaptation to practical requirements. Details will be presented in the passage dealing with the proposal for a new procedure. 
A Procedure is not the Solution of the Problem, it Only
Offers a Structure If debtor countries (or other institutions) are of the opinion that a procedure for the settlement of debts offers a method of automatically obtaining a discharge from the residual debt, their attention should be drawn to the following limitation: The present proposal for the procedure does not contain any detailed explanation with regard to the material substance.22 Its main goal is more modest: It should serve as a primary step which shall be taken before dealing with substantive problems. Thereby procedural justice23 (Verfahrensgerechtigkeit) shall be achieved for the negotiations in the context of debt management. Hence, a base should be created from which a process can be initiated according to which contents are desirable, available and possible to enact.24 Consequently, the establishment of such a procedure does not imply that the debtor is automatically discharged from his existing debts. Such discharge is not impossible but it is dependent on the approval of the majority of creditors.
II. TERMINOLOGY AND CONTENT OF MODERN INSOLVENCY LAW

A. The Comprehensive Concept of "Insolvency"
Outside the circle of experts of insolvency law and outside the United States of America, bankruptcies and "going bust" normally evoke associations that have entirely negative connotations and have even made the "flaw of bankruptcy" an object of literary discourse.25 From this perspective, it is fully understandable that a procedure for the settlement of debts which is based on the model of insolvency law is regarded skeptically, or is even rejected.
However, there has been evolution in this context. The ideal of a "fresh start" which has been obvious in the U.S. for a while (see infra, II.C.3) and which results from the country's history of origin, is also being adopted in other countries and is reflected linguistically by the In the non-governmental field there were at least two lines of development which contributed to the fact that modern insolvency law is not any more solely concerned with the liquidation of the debtor's estate which was, for a millennia, the only way of satisfying creditors. This goal is nowadays being achieved alternatively and sometimes even exclusively by different means: The re-integration of the debtor into the market with the support of the creditors.
-The first line of development was initiated by the U.S. legislation (chapter 11-procedure). It corresponds with the emergence of a post-industrial service society (Dienstleistungsgesellschaft) in the western hemisphere. Here, debtors generally do not have any estates which can be eradicated. The worth of their corporation consists of values which can hardly be sold or even evaluated, and which are therefore more or less intensely bound to their person (know how, good will, connections, clientele, etc.). In these constellations it is quite useless for the creditors to strive for a liquidation of such assets. The existing goods can be materialized far more effectively if the debtor is given the possibility to (re-)invest these assets in the market and optimize them.30 -The second line of development is the economic development of the so-called transition countries which have moved from governmental control to the system of free enterprise. If one wanted to apply the western standard of insolvency law to these countries, practically all firms and corporations would be forced into liquidation. In order to prevent such an unbearable result which would lead to a systematic 26. The non-legal literature has so far applied the term "international insolvency law" in this context. From the legal point of view it has to be pointed out that this term is already used for such cases where the estate of a debtor (according to private law) is not situated in a single country, i.e., it refers to cases in which the insolvency procedure has a cross-border effect. breakdown, conditions need to be created under which the debtor is able to re-enter the market and is not driven out of it.
See International Monetary
B. The Plan Proceeding
The alternative way for creditors to be satisfied is to "help the debtor to his feet" instead of resorting to liquidation of his or her assets; for the debtor is the one who best can realize their value. This process is called "Planverfahren" (plan proceeding) in Germany and is defined at length in sec. 217ff. InsO. In simple terms, it deals with the following:
Description
The plan proceeding is a regular insolvency procedure. Its opening leads to the so-called automatic stay, i.e., the debtor is protected from creditors' actions, as he is, at the same time, not allowed to take any actions which could affect the creditors' position to their disadvantage. A plan for the reorganization of the debtor (which might possibly have to fulfil certain minimum requirements concerning the satisfaction of the creditors) is worked out and presented. This plan is discussed and put to the vote in a given -and therefore transparentprocedure. In contrast to the usual out of court restoration efforts, which are dependent on unanimous acceptance a majority vote suffices. In order to facilitate the procedure and reduce its complexity the creditors can be put together in groups whereby the formation of such groups is done under the aspect of functionality. The plan is considered approved if a majority group within each agrees to it. This result is binding for all creditors.
The English "London Approach"
This somewhat condensed outline shows that a court or a neutral authority with the power to decide does not necessarily need to be involved in the performance of a plan proceeding.31 Accordingly, the English banks, under the lead and authority of the Bank of England, have developed the so-called "London Approach" which implies a similar mechanism for out-of-court-settlements for enterprises that are on the edge of insolvency: When banks learn about crisis indicators of their debtor enterprises, they are not supposed to immediately start with the realization of their securities which would send the enterprises into even further into insolvency. On the contrary, they should refrain from such actions and rather try to search for solutions together with the debtor and other creditors (banks, suppliers, etc.) in order to stabilize the debtor's situation. 31 . If "Eigenverwaltung" (debtor in possession) is ordered pursuant to sec. 270ff. InsO, a "Sachwalter" (trustee) has merely a supervising function.
538
[Vol. 50
A Worldwide "London Approach"
It deserves attention that there are currently efforts to globalize this method, i.e., to have it applied not only by the English banks.32 The so-called Lenders' Group of INSOL International (an association of international insolvency practitioners) has agreed to a code of conduct which comprises eight principles.33 It shall be recommended as a standard for the conduct of all large creditors towards their debtors who are in serious financial difficulties. Even if the success of these efforts is questionable as there is no common superior authority, the approach as such is instructive -especially because the banks have made clear that as far as private law enterprises are concerned, they are willing to take responsibility for the restoration of financially weak enterprises. If these recommendations are adopted, the sanction for a conduct which infringes the code would be a kind of outlawry within the banking community -this would possibly have a more disciplinary effect than any legal measure.34
C. Model Function of the Regulatory Mechanism of Private Law
Transferred to the context of the regulation of governmental debts, it can be concluded from these conceptual clarifications that the private law insolvency proceeding can certainly have a model function. For, according to the new understanding, the proceeding does certainly not imply a removal from the community of nations and therefore a liquidation35 (which is naturally not to be discussed); to the contrary, it provides for the integration into this community. Hence, it is necessary to take a look at which peculiarities or advantages have led to the creation of an insolvency law under private law -at least as far as this is important for the present context. At this point, one has to recall that institutions like the IMF and the World Bank have realized the fundamental importance of insolvency law under private law for the global economic system only very recently and that they have designed standards for more modern and more efficient insolvency laws.
The Disciplinary Effect
As already mentioned above, a decisive reason for the creation of insolvency law is the disciplinary effect that it has on the participants. This is usually emphasized for the debtor,36 but it is equally 32 
Majority Rule instead of Unanimity
While the preliminary negotiations require unanimity to achieve a legally binding agreement, which adds difficulty to these restoration efforts, the insolvency procedure only requires a howsoever constituted majority. This is one of the essential disciplinary effects for dissenting creditors ("troublemakers").38 This simplification is achieved by the fact that insolvency law is binding (ius cogens) and unites all creditors in a compulsory community ("Zwangsgemeinschaft") which prevents them -whether they like it or not and whether they are aware of it or not -from taking proceedings against the debtor individually.39 As this procedure wants to solve a financial crisis, not only the debtor but also the creditors, lose some of their rights. They also have to make a contribution for the sake of overcoming the debtor's crisis. This is essential in order to have a solution that can be considered fair and constitutional. Here, indeed, is probably the crucial problem when implementing a governmental procedure for the settlement of debts.40
Objectives of Insolvency Law
The objectives of the insolvency laws are by no means uniform. While in Germany the satisfaction of the creditors is predominant, the U.S. insolvency law focuses on the so-called "fresh start," i.e., the possibility for the debtor to start again. In France, the idea that insolvency law is to be designed to save as many jobs as possible (even if this is at the expense of the creditors) is prevalent to a certain degree while in Argentina the primary objective is to preserve enterprises as far as possible. In Italy, there is a procedure which aims even quite directly at the return of governmentally granted loans 
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According to the objective of a given insolvency law the importance of the diverging interests varies. Therefore, the aim of the insolvency law in question should be clear from the very beginning. Hence, regarding a possible proceeding for debt management, it is helpful (if not indispensable) to decide right at the beginning whether this procedure should focus on the satisfaction of the creditor, the improvement of a country's economic productiveness or, e.g., on the improvement of the living conditions of the country's population.41
III. PROPOSAL FOR THE PROCEDURE
The preceding comments have shown that it is very well possible to create a governmental procedure for debt management using elements from the existing private law insolvency.42 Again, it is to be emphasized that a plan proceeding does not result in the liquidation of the debtor's estate. Especially the U.S. chapter 9-procedure (which can serve insofar as a model) demonstrates that such a procedure does not have to lead to the waiver of sovereign rights and interests.
Having this in mind, the following proceeding appears to be feasible: sent. Looking at this approach from a constitutional viewpoint, it is, however, not acceptable because, in the end, it is again a creditor (may he also be benevolent) who decides whether the debtor can take the procedure or not.46 The rules of fair trial demand that this autonomy (or sovereignty) be left at the debtor and that he alone be able to initiate the procedure. The interests of the creditor are adequately protected as the debtor's motion is subject to an abuse control. Criteria of Selection: The positive aspect about searching for a suitable neutral third person is that the number of prospective persons should be kept quite small. The significance of this subject calls for the development of an expertise which is on the one hand highly important for the predictability of the procedure and on the other hand ensures that the procedure is accomplished -as a result of the gathered experience -with the highest possible competence. The smaller the number of prospective third persons, the better this objective can be achieved.
Compared to this primary requirement it is only of secondary importance how to determine this pool and where to establish it: One can either establish it in an institution ("institution solution"), e.g., the United Nations or one of their sub-organizations, or at the International Court of Justice47 (or, respectively, a subdivision there which would have to be created there). From the legal point of view the latter is more reasonable. It is, however, also possible to organize the pool more openly and allow the parties to select -comparable to the usual arbitration procedure -each a preferred person who himself appoints a superior third person ("arbitration solution"). This approach leads to the difficulty to determine the members of the pool, i.e., the problem who should be authorized to select the pool.
The "arbitration solution" has the advantage of higher flexibility and possibly also higher acceptance because at least one of the deciding votes has been appointed by oneself. As opposed to this, the "institution solution" has the advantage of being more neutral and easier to determine. 
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the Anglo-American model of a judge who acts mainly as a controlling "supervisor" or its European counterpart (on the continent) who has had more or less invasive influence on the judgment ever since. In the first case the neutral third person is limited to verify the existence of an opening reason (infra, III.A.2), to check the submitted plan mainly with regard to its realization and completeness (infra, III.A.5a), to question whether the proposal of the motion is abusive (infra, III.A.5b), to preside over the negotiations of the plan, to control whether the plan has been correctly materialized and approved (infra, III.B.3) and finally to supervise the execution of the plan (infra, III.3).
The more active variant of the neutral third person adds additional elements relating to the content to the above-mentioned description of tasks: the verification whether the substantive postulates of the plan are fulfilled (infra, III.A.6), the realization of conceded rights of recovery (infra, III.B.2), the competence to submit own proposals for a plan (infra, III.B.3), etc. If the neutral third person is legally qualified (which would naturally be the case with a judge of the International Court of Justice or its subdivision), he could furthermore be assigned the task to verify the indicated debts with regard to their legality, i.e., to check, for example, whether the formal requirements, etc. of the laws of the respective countries are fulfilled.49
Opening Reasons
In light of a study which has been prepared by the academic commission of the BMZ,50 it has to be indicated that so far the opening reasons for an insolvency proceeding has so far not been satisfactorily determined or legally defined. Nevertheless insolvency law has functioned well for millennia. Hence, this difficulty is no counter-argument for the introduction of a procedure for the settlement of debts.
Overindebtedness as an opening reason raises, however, considerable difficulties already under private law.51 Therefore the adaptation of this reason to the here discussed context of countries is extraordinarily problematic. As a result one can only think about recurring to cessation of payment or illiquidity as opening reasons both of which are generally accepted reasons. These reasons are given if the debtor cannot fulfil his liabilities in full.52 One could also consider in this context whether the so-called imminent illiquidity should be sufficient as opening reason. By initiating the procedure at an earlier 49 point, the chances of speeding up the settlement of debts increase. Because at this time there are still more liquid assets than at a later time when they have been exhausted -due to the inability to pay -to a larger extent.53
The problem of the opening reason, however, can be solved entirely differently -that is by means of abuse control which has to be carried out anyway by the neutral third person (see infra, 5b). He makes a synopsis of all circumstances that have made the country file the petition and he decides whether this complies with the requirements of loyalty and good faith (bona fides).
Type of Procedure
The only possible type of procedure is the plan proceeding. Each thought about liquidation, judicial execution or whatever coercive measures is, as emphasized above, to be excluded from the very beginning. Therefore only a plan proceeding is possible. This has to be organized in such a way that the creditors and the debtor are brought together in order to discuss -under the supervision of a neutral third person -the plan for the management of debts which has been presented by the debtor.54 Then the plan has to be put to the vote and to be decided upon.
Right to File a Motion
As far as this subject is concerned, the U.S. chapter 9-procedure seems exemplary -it should be the exclusive right of the debtor country to file a petition and, thus to initiate the proceeding.55 This is essential in order to maintain sovereignty because the admissibility of a petition filed by a creditor or even an institution would force the debtor country into a duty to act which is in the worst case not advisable or restrains the debtor country to act.
With regard to the aforementioned advantage of each insolvency procedure (infra, II.C.1) that its sole existence has a disciplinary effect on all involved parties, the here presented proposal seems like a one-sided favoritism of the debtor. For if only the debtor country is given the possibility to initiate the procedure, it is thereby given a means of pressure which it can -in contrast to the creditor -always use, e.g., at the negotiations with the Paris or London Club. This imbalance is, however, indispensable because of the reasons mentioned above. Therefore, it has to be compensated -at least to a certain degree -by imposing higher demands upon the admissibility of the peti- (supra, III.A.4) ; it is the introduction of certain requirements, the fulfillment of which has to be verified by the neutral third person. Probably the most important requirement is that along with the filing of the petition for the initiation of the proceeding a plan be submitted by the debtor country which contains solutions or proposals of how -according to its own opinion -its problems can be solved. Even if this plan will only be dealt with and discussed with the creditors after the proceeding has been instituted, the plan should be assessed at least roughly with regard to its feasibility at the beginning.56 By this means it can and shall be prevented that the procedure is carelessly instituted, its sole purpose being to keep the creditors waiting without considering their interests.
b) No Abuse
Closely connected to the aforementioned argument is another requirement of admissibility-the examination whether the motion was filed with abusive intent. In order to evaluate this aspect, the neutral third person would have to be generally able to obtain the necessary information from the International Monetary Fund as well as the World Bank (among others). It might be at this point that a petition is remitted if, e.g., a country files it in order to get discharged from its reparation obligations after a lost war; this would constitute a behavior which is in contradiction to its former deeds (venire contra factum proprium). An exception could be made here possibly if the petition were filed by a government which is not identical with the one responsible for the war.
A special variant of the abuse control would be an additional requirement of admissibility: to allow a motion from the debtor country only if such a motion has not been filed within a certain period of time -2, 5, 7, 10 years, etc. In this way, any inflationary use of this new instrument could be controlled.
Substantive Requirements
The aforementioned requirements of admissibility only refer to more or less formal criteria. They can naturally be extended by fur-56. At this point it becomes evident that the aforementioned expertise of the neutral third person is particularly desirable. ther, more substantial requirements. There is a big variety regarding the contents of these requirements. Possible standards can be extracted from the requirements which are demanded by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund on the basis of their conditionality57.58 If one were of the opinion that such minimum requirements are desirable one has to think about which aims one wants to achieve with the insolvency proceeding which is being proposed here (cp. II.C.3). For, it makes sense that the substantive minimum requirements are in conformity with these aims -not to mention that such minimum requirements must certainly not infringe the sovereignty rights and obligations of the debtor country.
In view of the fact that the proposed procedure can only be a plan proceeding which tries to help the debt-burdened country to take part again actively in economic life, the country has to be given the minimum means of subsistence (however this may be defined) also for the phase during which the plan is executed. Otherwise the proceeding would be a "still-birth" from the beginning because it would already not be politically justifiable for the debtor country's population. This cannot be of interest for the donating countries either.
Effects a) General Effects
Once the petition is filed, the debtor must immediately be protected from creditors' attachment. Not only is this mechanism -the "automatic stay" -characteristic of insolvency procedures under private law, but it also has to be introduced in the envisaged procedure for the management of state debts. Only with the help of this mechanism can the intended advantages of this procedure, i.e., the disciplinary effect and especially the systematic and transparent way of bringing about a consent, be achieved. However, one should consider whether this "stay" should be limited in time in order to speed up the proceedings.
The problems resulting from the "automatic stay" will be illustrated in connection with the formation of an enforced community (infra, III.B.1). However, it has to be mentioned that the putting through of such a "stop" is difficult with regard to all creditors -be they public or private -because it cannot be sanctioned in the same way by domestic law as its pendant under private law. But the aforementioned "London Approach" shows nevertheless that practically the same effect can be achieved by way of "voluntary" submission -in that case the voluntariness is ensured by the superior authority of 57. See Weigeldt, supra n. 19. 58. Informative regarding Germany's experience so far: Pieske, "Miglichkeiten und Grenzen der Entschuldung durch Gegenwertfonds," in Dabrowski, Eschenburg & Gabriel, supra n. 1, at 207ff. [Vol. 50 the Bank of England. In this context, however, a comparable effect is probably not even possible by means of an international obligation which is not binding for private creditors. At the most, this effect can be achieved if the banking world comes to a corresponding agreement which threatens possible offenders of the "automatic stay" with outlawry or the flaw of illoyalty. As already shown, especially banks seek exactly this effect for usual insolvencies of enterprises, i.e., those under private law (supra, II.B.3) . In consideration of this, it is not only applicable for debtors under private law, but a fortiori also for countries -especially if one bears in mind the above-mentioned situation of the world where few more than 200 members must try to find a modus vivendi which is necessary to survive together.
Obviously, the "automatic stay" on the creditors' side must have a corresponding counter-part on the debtor country's side: the prohibition of the debtor country to take actions which could affect the creditors' position to their disadvantage.59 It is the task of the neutral third person to control this and he should be able to have access to the information basis of the IMF and the World Bank. The observance of this task of the debtor can be indirectly enforced by repealing the proceeding in case of violation and thereby letting the consequences ensue which will be described later (infra, III.B.3).
b) Subsequent Creditors
The effect that has just been illustrated is, however (and selfevidently), not applicable to such creditors who have granted the debtor country new credit after the procedure was instituted. Such new credit, which is generally indispensable for the feasibility of the plan, could only be obtained in highly exceptional cases if it was not privileged compared to the existing claims in the procedure for the settlement of debts.
B. Procedure
Enforced Community a) Lack of Competence
It has already been mentioned that probably the greatest difficulty in adapting the rules of private insolvency law to a governmental proceeding for the settlement of debts is that all creditors existing at the time of the institution of the procedure60 must be includedanother difficulty is how to achieve this result. While the national 59. Naturally it must be examined diligently which actions may not be restricted (as they are derived from incontestable principle of sovereignty) and which of them put the creditors at a disadvantage. 63. See especially for the "exit consents" that Ecuador has introduced: International Monetary Fund, supra n. 61, at 8, 11. Id., at 12 concerning the "pari passu clauses." abstract, either duress or an incentive are possible means. The latter, i.e., an incentive, can be made in the form of exchange offers -as has been the case in Ecuador and Pakistan.64 The success of such a procedure depends on whether the creditors "fall" for it.65 If not, a possibility to sanction is missing as far as it is not contractually agreed to. Duress is out of the question as long as the national legislation does not introduce a mutual precept of respect. Whether such a precept is possible and -above all -whether it would be binding for foreign creditors, is more than doubtful.
The proposal for a proceeding which is made here can reduce the problem in so far as the private bond holders can be -in case groups are formed -bound together within one group. This would be consistent with permissible and factual criteria of division as for example the classification of other private or public creditors. Hence, the bond holders would only have a single vote as a group when the plan is put to the vote.
Avoidability
The aforementioned chapter 9-procedure has one special feature which is common to practically all insolvency laws on this earth: the avoidability of transfers and transactions which the debtor had undertaken before the procedure was instituted and which -after the opening of the proceeding -prove to be disadvantageous for the entirety of the creditors who are involved. Naturally not all transactions can be affected by this retroactive rescission, but only those which have certain negative features: a prevalent standard for this is on the one hand the preferential treatment of individual creditors and on the other hand the intention to discriminate the creditors collectively with the transaction in question.66
If certain payments can be reclaimed when the procedure is instituted, this alone already implies a certain disciplinary effect for especially pressing creditors. If they collect their claims selfishly and even with force, they must expect that exactly this performance of the debtor will be reclaimed in the procedure that will be subsequently instituted. This causes -according to the efficiency of the actual realization of such a reclaim possibility -possibly a more or less intense pressure to act conformably already in the pre-procedural stages of debt management, i.e., in such stages where negotiations are made If this option which has been well-established in the private law insolvency proceeding for millennia is transferable to the governmental procedure for the management of debts, the additional question arises whose transactions should be rescinded: only those of the government or also those of the reigning person who has used money which was meant for the government privately. If a private yacht is bought, the question is easy to answer. The situation is more complicated if the issue at stake is a prestige object which is of no use for the population, e.g., the air terminal in no-man's-land, etc. These particular problems should, however, not deter from generally introducing the option of contestation. For it is, as has been shown, an important step with the help of which the here proposed proceeding would not even have to be applied at all in praxi.
Consent
Naturally the plan requires the consent of the creditors. It is, however, not clear which creditors are referred to in this context. In any case, all public and private foreign creditors have to be included. Because of reasons of fairness it is then also indicated to include domestic banks as well. Whether, beyond that, domestic private creditors are to be included, should be decided individually by the neutral third person. One could fundamentally support the inclusion although exceptions should be made in reasonable cases.
In contrast to the non-procedural negotiations, e.g., in the Paris or London Club, the requirement of unanimity for the consent of the plan is not feasible. The subsequent question what kind of majorities should be necessary in order to pass the plan depends on which priorities one sets. A majority between 51 and 99% is thinkable whereby one can further differentiate according to the amount of the claims ("sum") and the number of creditors ("heads") or one can classify the creditors in groups for voting (supra, II.B.1).
The consequence if an agreement is not reached is -depending on the powers of the neutral third person -either negotiations for a new plan or the failure of the proceeding. The latter is an acceptable consequence (although it should be avoided if possible) as the agreement only fails if the required majority is not obtained. Thereby it is impossible that one (or some few) creditors negotiate in such a way that they persistently and continually abide by their "nay". He or they must be prepared to be crammed down in the proceeding. The more the required majority for the approval of the plan is reduced towards 51%, the bigger the risk is for such creditors. On the other hand, the mere possibility that the plan fails ensures that the debtor 
